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SUMMARY
Unfunded state pension schemes are projected to become financially unsustainable.
This is usually attributed to demographic trends. Yet trends in unemployment and
in female labour force participation are quantitatively as important. Improvements
in either or both might be sufficient to rescue existing state schemes, especially if
combined with an end to the practice of allowing, even after retirement, the value
of a pension to rise with national earnings rather than prices.
Attempts at piecemeal reform are important because nothing in economic theory
suggests a switch to the alternative, fully funded pensions is desirable. Not only
would such a transition be costly, and therefore politically difficult; it also neglects
the fact that it makes sense to diversify the retirement portfolio, holding claims both
on labour productivity and on capital assets. One can even view pensions as part
of a more sophisticated system of intergenerational transfers through which
workers finance their earlier education and subsequent retirement.
Michele Boldrin, Juan J. Dolado, Juan F. Jimeno and Franco Peracchi
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we challenge the received wisdom that the ageing bomb will, and should,
explode our unfunded pay as you go (PAYG) public pension systems; and that a rapid
transition to fully funded, or capitalized, pension plans is the best solution. This
recommendation is misguided and unwise. We dispute both the assumptions and the
analysis on which they are based.
For a detailed articulation of the consensus view, see World Bank (1994), BIS (1998)
and the literature quoted therein. Here we offer a simplified summary of this view.
Because of demographic trends, during the next 30 to 50 years, the elderly dependency
ratio (ratio of population older than 60 to the population aged 20 59) will keep growing,
probably to double its current high level. Under the pension systems prevailing in the
EU, this implies continuous growth of the pension burden, the ratio of total pension to
GDP.
Pensions, already 12% of EU GDP in 1995, are being financed almost entirely by a
tax on labour income. Reasonable projections put the pension burden well above 20% of
GDP within a few decades. The Stability and Growth Pact, limiting the size of
deficit=GDP ratios, will force EU countries to raise taxes to finance the increasing
pension outlays. This will raise labour costs dramatically, reduce employment, and
generate social and political unrest. Maintaining a PAYG pension system also reduces
We thank the editors, two anonymous referees, Friedrich Breyer, Karl Moene, Samuel Bentolila and the participants at the
29th Economic Policy Panel meeting for helpful comments on the first draft of this paper.
2
current savings, damaging the growth of income and employment and increasing the size
of the social security tax paid by the working few.
Various reform proposals have been advanced; see again World Bank (1994) and BIS
(1998) but also Davis (1998), Diamond (1997), European Commission (1997), Feldstein
(1996), Feldstein and Samwick (1998), Holzmann (1997), Kotlikoff (1995, 1996) and
Mitchell and Zeldes (1996). A common feature of these proposals is that, starting with
the second decade of the next millennium, old age pensions should be financed not, as
today, by a tax on earnings, but instead by annuities generated by financial assets that
are titles to the existing stock of productive capital.
The intuition behind this recommendation is straightforward. Total earnings, upon
which taxes are levied to finance pension payments, have been growing slowly during the
last two decades (2% a year in the EU, since the mid 1970s) and are likely to grow at a
similar pace in the foreseeable future. In contrast, the growth rate of the market value of
private investments, as measured by the growth rate of stock market indexes, has been
much higher (10% a year in real terms in the EU, since the early 1980s) and is not
expected to drop in the future. Consequently, working people are putting their
retirement eggs in the wrong basket. Barring an unlikely dramatic increase in future
contribution rates, the rate of return they will earn on their own pension contributions
may be less than a quarter of what they could have earned by investing in an appropriate
mixture of stocks and bonds.
According to its proponents, reallocating resources from PAYG contributions to
financial assets would eliminate many shortcomings of current systems. First,
demographic oscillations would no longer affect the financial viability of pension
payments. Second, political meddling with retirement income would be eliminated.
Third, private saving and investment would be boosted, fostering economic growth.
Feldstein (1995) provides a list of conditions under which a shift from unfunded to
funded systems should raise social welfare: (1) a positive growth rate of the economy;
(2) a rate of return on capital higher than the growth rate of national income; and (3) a
rate of return on capital higher than the rate of time preference. Abundant statistical
evidence shows that conditions (1) and (2) are easily satisfied in the EU countries. The
large flows of private saving towards financial markets in the last two decades suggest that
(3) is also true.
We claim that this consensus view is seriously incomplete in its diagnosis of the
deficiencies of PAYG systems, biased in its description of the merits of the fully funded ones,
and off the mark in identifying the structural factors making unfunded systems financially
unsustainable. We aim to expose the flaws in the consensus view, then to provide a more
complete analytical framework for thinking about social security reforms in Europe.
The benefits of a shift to a fully funded system are said to be derived from four
statements, put forward either as undisputed facts or as obvious assumptions:
(a) The projected dramatic increase in the pension burden is mainly due to a
demographic shock, which can be avoided only by abandoning PAYG systems.
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(b) Transition to a fully funded system can be engineered without a large fall in the
pension payments of the currently retired and of cohorts due to retire during the
next 30 years.
(c) The rate of return on capital will always exceed the growth rate of total earnings.
(d) An efficient pension system should be a mix, primarily based on a capitalization
scheme.
We claim these assumptions or assertions should be replaced with the following:
(A) A quarter of the projected increase in the pension burden reflects demographic
change; three quarters reflects worsening labour market conditions and growing
pension generosity.
(B) Transition to a fully funded system cannot be achieved without a substantial
reduction in current pension payments unless it is financed by issuing public debt.
The gains from such transition would accrue to generations that are not yet born.
(C) It is likely that the growth rate of earnings will continue to be smaller, on average,
than the rate of return on capital, but the latter is much more volatile. Historically,
the two returns are negatively correlated.
(D) An efficient pension system should be a mix of funded and PAYG systems. The mix
should evolve with the movements in returns on physical and human capital and
their correlation.
We contrast the two sets of claims (a) (d) and (A) (D). Section 2 describes current
systems of social protection and pensions, and reports demographic and labour market
projections up to 2050. At first sight, current EU systems of contributory public pensions
are financially doomed. In addition to demography, two other trends play a key role:
much lower labour force participation and much higher unemployment rates; and the
practice of increasing real pensions, even after retirement, at the rate of labour
productivity growth. Simulations in section 3 quantify these factors and show that claim
(A) is a much better description of the facts than (a).
Section 4 supports claim (B) over (b). It draws on simple logical considerations
(developed first in Breyer (1989) and extended by various authors) and on the few
studies that try to quantify the implications of a transition from unfunded to fully funded
systems (especially Holzmann, 1997; Miles, 1999; Miles and Iben, 1998; and Miles and
Timmermann, 1999). Even if the growth rate of earnings is permanently lower than the
rate of return on capital, once a PAYG system is in place it is not possible to shift to a
capitalization system and make future generations better off without making at least one
intermediate generation worse off. This has serious critical implications for those reform
proposals, like that of Feldstein (1999), which advocate investing social security
contributions in the stock market as an almost painless way of avoiding the future
pension burden.
Quantitative exercises show that the benefits from a new funded system will accrue
only to generations scarcely or not yet born; financing the transition imposes large costs
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on generations currently alive. No free lunches are available. Nor will taxing current
generations (voters) to benefit future generations (not yet voters) be politically appealing.
Policies to spread costs and benefits more smoothly across generations should therefore
be designed.
The second half of section 4 considers claims (c) and (C), which are not mutually
inconsistent. However, the attractiveness of different investment strategies cannot be
established by looking only at expected returns. Risk matters and should affect reform design.
Section 5 shows why human capital is the first and most natural candidate for an asset
in pension portfolios. We show how integrated public education and PAYG pension
systems can be used to achieve the efficient level of investment in human capital. This
simple insight shows that a pension system based upon capitalization alone cannot be
efficient. Feldsteins (1995) claim for the superiority of funded systems is wrong not just
because it neglects transitional costs, but also because it is dominated by a mixed PAYG
and fully funded system. Even if transition were costless, we would not want to
implement a complete shift from PAYG to capitalization.
This link between pension risk and optimal portfolio allocation is not new (see
Merton, 1983). What is new is the logical and practical connection we establish between
public investment in education and payments of future retirement pensions. A logically
correct and socially efficient approach to reforming pension systems takes public
financing of education (not social security contributions) as the investment on which
pensions are the due return. While the growth rate of earnings may be lower than the
rate of return on physical capital, its riskiness is also much lower. Indeed, the negative
correlation between the two returns suggests that a well diversified portfolio should
contain both. Claim (D) is better than (d).
Thus, section 2 describes the current situation and likely trends in the absence of reform.
Section 3 examines how the PAYG burden is affected by labour market conditions and the
generosity of pensions. Section 4 shows that transition from PAYG to full funding cannot
benefit every generation, and that benefits are likely to accrue only to generations not yet
born. Section 5 proposes an analytical framework for thinking about the design of efficient
pension systems. Section 6 elaborates implications for policy design.
2. EUROPEAN PENSION SYSTEMS: FACTS AND THE CURRENT DEBATE
First, we briefly describe the relevance of social protection expenditures (SPE), in which
the role of pensions is prominent. Second, we document the demographic and labour
market scenarios under which pension systems are expected to operate in future decades.
Finally, we briefly describe the main institutional features of European pension systems.
2.1. Social protection expenditures
Social protection expenditure is a major part of public spending in all EU countries,
although Table 1 shows important differences across countries. In 1995 overall SPE was
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28% of GDP and 52% of total government expenditures in the EU. As a share of GDP,
it is lowest in the southern countries and Ireland (around 20%), and highest in the
Nordic countries (around 35%). SPE per capita also varies markedly between northern
and southern EU countries, being double in the latter what it is in the former. This
pattern is broadly in line with the levels of GDP per capita.
The last two columns of Table 1 report the ratio of pension expenditures to SPE and
to GDP. Excluding Greece (data unavailable), EU pension expenditures in 1995 were to
42% of SPE and 12% of GDP. In all EU countries, except Ireland, pensions are the
largest component of SPE, ranging from 32% in Finland to 63% in Italy.
2.2. Demographic and labour market scenarios
2.2.1. The demographic scenario. This section compares the current demographic
structure of EU economies, taking into account the evolution of fertility rates and life
expectancy over the period 1960 95. Demographic projections of the relevant
dependency ratios for the period 1995 2050 are then presented.
Total population in the EU (including eastern German Lander) rose from 315 million
in 1960 to 374 million in 1995. This average annual growth of 0.45% fluctuated across
decades, being as high as 0.8% in the 1960s, but only 0.25% in the 1980s. Despite a
small recent recovery of population growth, mostly due to rising net migration and
higher fertility rates in Scandinavia, demographers seem to agree that EU population
growth will slow down.
Table 1. Social protection and pension spending in the EU, 1995
Social protection spending Pension spending
% of GDP % of G % of SPE % of GDP
Austria 30 55 47 14
Belgium 30 53 40 12
Denmark 34 55 37 13
Finland 34 55 32 10
France 31 55 41 13
Germany 30 54 41 12
Greece 21 45 n.a. n.a.
Ireland 20 40 25 5
Italy 25 54 63 15
Luxembourg 25 58 43 11
Netherlands 32 56 36 11
Portugal 21 42 39 8
Spain 22 50 44 10
Sweden 36 49 37 13
UK 29 57 38 10
EU average 28 52 42 12
Note: SPE is social protection expenditure, G is total government spending.
Source: Eurostat.
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Current trends in fertility are documented in Table 2. There has been a large decline
in fertility rates, especially where these were initially highest (Ireland, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain). Life expectancy rose considerably during 1960 95. Fertility has
shown a negative relation between initial levels and subsequent evolution. The dispersion
across EU countries in both fertility and life expectancy has decreased noticeably.
Table 3 provides a synthetic comparison of the current demographic structure of the
EU countries, and the future evolution implied by Eurostats baseline demographic
projections (Eurostat, 1996). It shows the youth dependency ratio (ratio of people aged
less than 20 to the working age population aged 20 59), and the old age dependency
ratio (the ratio of people aged 60 to the working age population). Two groups of
countries are evident, with two outliers, Ireland and Italy. Dependency is high in the first
group (Belgium, France, Greece, Spain, Sweden and the UK) but low in the second
group (Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands). Ireland has a high youth
dependency ratio, but a relatively low old age ratio; Italy has a high old age dependency
ratio and a relatively low youth dependency ratio.
In all countries, old age dependency ratios are expected to increase substantially,
nearly doubling by 2050. Youth dependency ratios should fall slightly until 2020, then
come back somewhat. For old age ratios, Belgium, Finland and Italy are expected to
have the largest in 2020, while Spain, Italy and Ireland face the most severe old age
demographic pressure in 2050, with ratios above 80% of the working age population.
Changes in the youth ratios are much smaller, with the exception of Ireland, where the
Table 2. Demographic indicators in the EU, 1995
Fertility rate Life expectancy at birth 1995 life
expectancy at
60
1960 level Change 1960 95 1960 level Change 1960 95 Male Female
Austria 2.7 1.3 69 7 77 83
Belgium 2.6 1.0 71 6 79 83
Denmark 2.5 0.7 72 3 78 82
Finland 2.7 0.9 69 7 78 83
France 2.7 1.1 70 8 80 85
Germany 2.4 1.1 72 4 78 83
Greece 2.3 0.9 70 8 80 83
Ireland 3.8 1.9 70 6 77 81
Italy 2.4 1.2 70 8 79 84
Luxembourg 2.3 0.6 69 7 79 84
Netherlands 3.1 1.6 73 4 79 83
Portugal 3.1 1.7 64 11 78 82
Spain 2.9 1.6 70 8 79 84
Sweden 2.2 0.3 73 6 80 84
UK 2.7 1.0 71 6 78 82
EU average 2.6 1.1 70 7 79 83
Source: Eurostat.
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dependency ratio is expected to fall by almost 20 percentage points between 1995 and
2020, and then remain low.
2.2.2. The labour market. Tables 4 and 5 show falling labour force participation rates
(LFPRs) for youths, but rising unemployment rates for all age groups, resulting in shorter
contribution periods to the pension systems. LFPRs among the elderly have fallen
substantially, particularly among men, shortening contribution periods and increasing
the demand for pensions. Further, the incidence of unemployment among the elderly is
much higher nowadays, increasing pressure on pensions to substitute for unemployment
benefits in providing income for elderly unemployed workers.
Table 4 reveals marked differences across countries. Southern Europe has low youth
LFPRs, whereas Nordic countries have high LFPRs among the elderly. For central age
groups, the main differences arise from the behaviour of women, whose LFPRs are
lowest in the southern countries. The gap between male and female LFPRs is relatively
small in Scandinavian countries, particularly for ages over 45, but still sizeable in
Belgium, Ireland and southern Mediterranean countries. Figure 1 shows the
probability that a worker of a given age in the range 45 69 will retire within one
year. That probability is the slope of the current age participation profile. Peaks at
particular ages (typically 60 or 65) relate to rules governing retirement in the various
countries and, in particular, to the presence of early and normal retirement ages. This
effect is strong in France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Unemployment rates
in Table 5 do not need much comment: the incidence of unemployment has increased
across the board.
Table 3. EU dependency ratios: actual and projections to 2050 (%)
Youth (under 19) Elderly (60 and over) Total
1995 2020 2050 1995 2020 2050 1995 2020 2050
Austria 41 37 40 35 46 67 76 83 107
Belgium 44 42 44 39 54 66 83 96 111
Denmark 42 44 44 35 49 58 77 91 101
Finland 46 44 44 34 57 65 80 101 109
France 49 44 45 37 53 71 86 97 116
Germany 37 35 38 36 52 64 73 87 102
Greece 45 42 43 40 52 71 85 94 114
Ireland 67 49 48 30 50 105 97 99 152
Italy 38 36 38 40 56 82 78 92 119
Luxembourg 42 42 44 34 47 58 75 88 102
Netherlands 42 42 44 31 50 62 73 91 106
Portugal 48 42 43 37 45 66 85 86 108
Spain 46 37 46 38 48 83 84 86 121
Sweden 46 45 43 41 53 59 88 98 105
UK 47 41 43 38 48 67 85 90 110
EU average 43 39 41 37 51 72 80 91 113
Source: Eurostat.
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Table 4. Participation rates by age and sex, 1980 and 1995
Age 15 24 Age 25 54 Age 55 64
Men Women Men Women Men Women
1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995
Austria n.a. 65 n.a. 59 n.a. 93 n.a. 73 n.a. 43 n.a. 19
Belgium 46 36 42 32 94 92 54 68 51 36 12 13
Denmark 68 77 62 69 94 92 84 82 67 68 42 40
Finland 64 51 53 39 92 88 81 85 56 42 41 42
France 53 33 44 27 96 95 63 77 70 42 39 31
Germany 63 57 57 50 95 93 55 73 67 54 28 31
Greece 50 41 36 33 95 95 44 55 71 61 26 25
Ireland 69 49 54 42 95 91 28 55 78 64 20 21
Italy 49 44 40 34 93 89 39 54 56 44 11 14
Luxembourg 63 43 58 40 95 94 41 53 38 35 15 13
Netherlands 49 62 46 62 93 93 34 66 65 41 14 19
Portugal 78 47 64 39 95 94 55 74 76 62 32 35
Spain 71 48 49 42 96 93 30 55 77 55 22 20
Sweden 72 50 70 50 95 91 81 86 79 70 55 63
UK 87 74 68 65 95 93 69 74 79 62 38 41
EU average 63 52 53 44 94 92 54 69 65 52 28 28
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, various issues.
Table 5. Unemployment rates by age and sex, 1980 and 1995
Age 15 24 Age 25 54 Age 55 64
Men Women Men Women Men Women
1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995
Austria n.a. 6 n.a. 6 n.a. 4 n.a. 5 n.a. 4 n.a. 3
Belgium 10 20 29 24 7 6 15 11 12 4 4 4
Denmark 18 8 19 12 7 5 8 8 6 7 7 10
Finland 11 41 11 28 5 15 4 15 4 16 6 23
France 9 21 19 32 3 9 6 13 4 8 5 7
Germany 3 8 5 8 2 6 4 9 6 11 6 14
Greece 17 19 30 38 5 5 8 11 3 4 2 3
Ireland 10 21 8 17 7 11 5 11 7 8 4 9
Italy 21 29 31 38 2 7 7 12 2 4 7 5
Luxembourg 5 7 8 8 2 2 4 4 0 0 4 1
Netherlands 7 12 9 13 3 5 3 8 3 4 3 3
Portugal 10 15 27 17 2 5 7 7 0 5 1 3
Spain 18 37 22 49 6 15 5 28 5 13 1 11
Sweden 5 17 5 14 1 7 2 6 2 9 2 6
UK 9 18 8 12 5 9 6 6 8 10 5 4
EU average 11 19 17 22 4 8 6 11 4 9 4 8
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, various issues.
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2.3. Early retirement and youth unemployment: any relationship?
Employment rates of elderly workers are falling, largely as a result of deliberate
government policies. This is the single most damaging factor for financial sustainability of
PAYG pension schemes. As an important source of differential treatment for similar
workers, it has been a tool for political rent seeking and vote buying. Policies favouring
early retirement are often justified as a way to reduce youth unemployment. This
requires that there are a fixed number of total jobs, so that retiring an older worker frees
the same job for a younger one.
We collected labour market data for 260 NUTS II and NUTS III European regions in
1986, 1991 and 1996. These small areas are the territorial units at which the European
Commission targets employment policies and for which national governments devise
early retirement plans. Figures 2 and 3 plot, for men and women, the relationship
between the exit rates from the labour force of people born during 1931 40 and changes
in unemployment rates over 1991 6 of people aged 21 30. The substitution hypothesis
would imply a negative relationship. Our estimates find no such significant relationship
either for men or for women. Controlling for cohort effects or using different lags hardly
changes these results. Early retirement of older workers does not induce lower youth
unemployment.
Figure 1. Exit rates from the labour force, average 1994 6
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Figure 2. Exit rates of men born 1931 40, and changes in unemployment rates of
men aged 21 30, 1991 6
Figure 3. Exit rates of women born 1931 40, and changes in unemployment rates
of women aged 21 30, 1991 6
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2.4. The institutional framework
Pension schemes are mainly PAYG systems or funded systems, and may cover all
citizens, whether in need or not, or only contributors to a social insurance scheme.
Contributions and benefits may be flat rate (Beveridge formula), earnings related
(Bismarck formula) or, as in Scandinavian countries, of both types. In addition, many
EU countries have supplementary schemes, voluntary or compulsory, funded or
unfunded, often organized on an occupational, employment related base. Obviously,
retirement income may also be provided through private pension funds, which are
regulated and taxed differently in each country. Except for the UK, the Netherlands and
Scandinavia, private pension funds still provide a very low fraction of total retirement
income. Table A1 in the appendix provides a brief summary.
The interaction among the layers of different pensions systems makes it hard to
characterize their structure. Table A2 in the appendix summarizes the main rules of
earnings related plans.1 Public earnings related pensions are usually mandatory and
cover most employees: benefits are financed by contributions of employees and
employers. These systems are characterized by the contribution rate, the minimum
contribution period to qualify for benefits, the standard age of entitlement (which, with
life expectancy, determines the duration of benefits), the replacement rate (the ratio of
initial pension benefits to final earnings), the indexation rules and the amount of benefits
going to survivors.
The parameters in Table A2 can be used to compute, for each plan, the internal rate
of return (IRR) and the ratio between average pension p and labour productivity y, given
age, work seniority and earnings profiles. The IRR is the discount rate that makes the
present discounted value of the flow of pension benefits equal to the present discounted
value of the flow of social security contributions. When compared to the growth rate of
the total wage bill, the IRR indicates the long run solvency of a pension plan. For a given
contribution rate, if the average IRR is greater than the growth rate of total labour
income, additional resources are needed to finance pensions (Samuelson, 1975). The
ratio of average pension and labour productivity, together with the elderly dependency
ratio, determines the ratio of pension expenditures to GDP and therefore drives the
overall financial sustainability of the system.
Table 6 estimates IRRs and the ratio of pension to average productivity for some EU
countries. We make the following simplifying assumptions. Contribution rates remain
constant at current levels (Table A2). The contribution period is 35 years (often above the
average working period implied by the employment rates in Tables 4 and 5). The
retirement period is current life expectancy at 60 years (Table 2). Pension benefits obey
current rules, usually relating the pension replacement rate to the length of the
contributory period and the workers average earnings during a given period (Tables A2
and 6). Pensions are determined by the replacement ratio plus the ongoing indexation rule
1 For a detailed discussion of institutional features, see European Commission (1997) and the literature quoted therein.
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(Table A2). Real wages grow at the same rate as labour productivity, during both the
contributory and retirement periods, at an annual rate of 1.5% (Roseveare et al., 1996).
Our estimated IRRs, based on current rules, range from 2% in Germany and Italy to
5% in Sweden (where the contribution rate for the earnings related scheme is low). With
future productivity and employment growing at 1.5 and 0.5%2 respectively, the growth of
the wage bill would be below our estimated IRRs (except maybe in Italy). Either extra
resources are needed to cover pension expenditures or contributions must be raised and=or
pension benefits lowered to avoid permanent deficits in the current pension systems.
Table 6. Internal rates of return and pension benefits
Years Benefits IRR Pension as %
retired (%) of productivity
Austria 21 1.9% of wage for each year 1 15 3.0 43
1.5% of wage for each year 16 34
Belgium 21 0.675 (35=42.5) times lifetime average wages 3.8 32
Finland 20 0.575 times average wage in 2 of last 4 years 3.0 41
(excluding highest and lowest wage)
France 22 0.5 (35=37.5) times average wage in last 15 years 3.3 31
Germany 20 0.7 (35=37.5) times lifetime average wage 2.0 39
Greece 21 0.5 times average wage in last 5 years 2.7 36
Italy 21 0.7 times lifetime average wage 2.0 37
Portugal 20 0.7 times average wage in last 10 years 3.2 49
Spain 22 Average wage in last 15 years 3.0 66
Sweden 22 0.6 times lifetime average wage 4.9 35
2 Even 0.5% employment growth is optimistic for the EU15 in the near future.
Figure 4. Average pension=labour productivity, 1983 95
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For ratios of average pension to average labour productivity, our estimates range from
30% in France to 65% in Spain (whose 100% replacement rate of the average wage in
the last 15 years of the working life is much the largest in our sample of countries). These
estimates are not far from those currently observed in EU countries (except Spain and
Portugal), as can be seen in Figure 4. Thus, if current rules are maintained, the only
reason why the ratio of pension expenditures to GDP will increase is higher dependency
ratios.
2.5. The future of current systems: a simulation
We now quantify the financial distress that European public pension systems are
expected to suffer over the next 50 years. We simulate how the pension burden, the ratio
between total pension expenditures and GDP, would evolve if current trends and
legislation were maintained. Our simulations use the following decomposition of the
pension burden:
Pension expenditure
GDP
Dependency rate
Labour force participation rate
 Employment rate
 Pension per pensioner
GDP=worker
Our baseline simulation supplements Eurostat demographic projections for 1995 2050
with two further assumptions: that age specific LFPRs and unemployment rates for both
men and women remain constant at current levels; and that average labour productivity
and average pension expenditure per pensioner grow annually by 1%, keeping their ratio
Figure 5. Pension expenditure=GDP by country: baseline simulation
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constant. This last assumption is not far from the observed evidence during the period
1983 95 which, for most EU countries, shows no clear trend in that ratio (Figure 4).
This simulation shows pure demographic effects, with no changes in participation
rates, unemployment rates, or the ratio of pensions per pensioner to labour productivity.
The results are presented in Figure 5, which also reports the 1995 pension burden for
comparison.
The simulated pension burden grows in all countries, especially in France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. The increase is most notable in Italy, where a peak of
32.4% is reached in 2045. In France the peak of 24% is reached in 2050, in the
Netherlands 24.2% is reached in 2035, in Germany 24.1% is reached in 2045, in the UK
18.5% is reached in 2050, and in Spain 21% is reached in 2050. These are very high
numbers, more than twice the current values, and lend additional support to the view
that PAYG pension systems are doomed and that financial collapse can be averted only
by a swift transition to a funded system.
3. QUANTIFYING THE SOURCES OF LONG-RUN IMBALANCE
Unlike demographic trends, which are hard to affect by policy, participation rates,
unemployment levels and labour productivity are sensitive to changes in fiscal policies
and labour market legislation. Recent empirical evidence, such as Bl×ondal and Scarpetta
(1998) and Gruber and Wise (1998), also shows that several provisions of current PAYG
systems tend to lower labour force participation, facilitate early retirement and reduce
labour supply by citizens older than 50. Such provisions are not inevitable features of
PAYG systems, but rather the result of the political pressure and rent seeking behaviour
of special interest groups.
This is crucial for understanding the significance of the simulations that follow. They
are not meant to suggest that changing labour market behaviour to affect the solvency of
PAYG schemes is an easy task. Instead, we wish to demonstrate that it is not the PAYG
nature of the system that is leading to its financial collapse, and that the demographic
crisis, while serious, could be overcome if these other factors were not present.
After 1973 European productivity growth slowed and unemployment increased.
Reversals of these trends could have a significant effect on the solvency of PAYG pension
schemes. Further increases in labour force participation could also help. Moreover, the
degree of generosity of the scheme could be altered as a political choice. Figure 4 showed
that, in most EU countries, outstanding pensions have grown at roughly the same rate as
average labour productivity for the last 15 20 years: even after retirement, pensioners
benefit from productivity increases. This is a generous policy in comparison with merely
indexing pensions against inflation. If the replacement rate (the ratio of initial pension to
final earnings) were kept constant, only new pensions would grow at the same rate as labour
productivity. Let us call this a policy of constant generosity, with a lower case g. European
countries have instead adopted a policy of constant Generosity, with an upper case G, with
all pensions growing at the rate of labour productivity. This second kind of generosity is
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not an inevitable outcome of a properly functioning PAYG system, but rather the
outcome of political pressure from elderly citizens. It is particularly destabilizing when
coupled with increases in life expectancy of the size experienced by the EU countries
during the last 30 40 years.
Before deciding what is causing what, and what needs to be fixed, it is useful to
separate the impact of one policy choice from another. Given the current rules of the
system and current demographic trends, what would happen if female LFPRs converged
to those already observed in the UK and Scandinavia? What would happen if, in
addition, male employment rates were pushed back to the level of the early 1980s? What
would happen if we moved from a policy of constant Generosity to one of constant
generosity? Finally, what would happen if these changes in policy and labour market
conditions all happened together?
3.1. Alternative scenarios
Our four simulations share the demographic trends and old age dependency ratios of the
baseline simulation of section 2.5. Simulation 1 gradually increases labour force
participation rates and reduces unemployment rates, completing the adjustment by
2050. Within this scenario, we distinguish two cases. In simulation 1a, age specific male
LFPRs stay constant at their current level, female LFPRs increase until reaching 80% of
those of men, whereas age specific male and female unemployment rates converge to a
common value, equal to half the current level of male unemployment rates. In simulation
1b, age specific male LFPRs and unemployment rates revert to their levels in the early
1980s, female LFPRs increase until reaching 80% of those of men, and female
unemployment rates converge to male rates.
Simulation 2 replaces constant Generosity with constant generosity, while labour
productivity grows annually at either 1% (simulation 2a) or 2% (simulation 2b).
Everything else follows the same trends as in the baseline case. Simulation 3 combines
simulations 1 and 2. Labour productivity grows at 2% per year and we distinguish
between the two alternative labour market scenarios (simulations 3a and 3b). Simulation
4 considers a policy of decreasing generosity, with the ratio between new pensions and
labour productivity decreasing by half a percentage point a year, while labour
productivity grows at 2% per year. We distinguish between the two alternative labour
market scenarios (simulations 4a and 4b). Everything else follows the same trends as in
the baseline case.
Our assumptions about the behaviour of the female labour force are not very
demanding. Denmark, France, Germany and the UK have already reached female
LFPRs near 80% of male rates. Other countries, such as Ireland, already show no
gender differences in unemployment rates. Halving unemployment rates by 2020 is a
tougher assumption whose realization would entail substantial changes in the functioning
of the European markets.
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3.2. Basic findings
Figure 6 reports results of each of the eight simulations described above. For simplicity,
we only report EU averages obtained by weighting the available countries (Austria,
Finland, Greece and Sweden are excluded) by their share of the GDP. Each panel refers
to one of the four basic simulations, and presents the ratio of pension expenditures to
GDP, along with its current value (the unmarked horizontal line) and its value in the
baseline case. We define the demographic burden as the difference between the current
pension expenditures=GDP ratio and its value in the peak year. We will be mainly
concerned with the reductions in the demographic burden under each of the alternative
scenarios.
In simulation 1, in which LFPRs increase and unemployment rates fall, the
demographic burden is lower than in the baseline scenario by between one quarter (if
only female LFPRs increase) and one third (if LFPRs increase for both men and
women). These are substantial improvements over the baseline case. Such changes in
labour market conditions would substantially alleviate the future fiscal burden of PAYG
pension systems.
Higher participation rates are only a temporary palliative, since they eventually increase
the number of pensions to be financed. However, the quantitative significance of this
argument may be limited. To the extent that LFPRs increase among those already
entitled to some minimum pension, the solvency of the system may be enhanced. This
would apply in countries in which very short work histories currently bring generous
pension entitlements (for quantitative evaluations, see the papers in Gruber and Wise
(1998)). A similar argument applies to the possible effects of lower unemployment rates:
Figure 6. Pension expenditure=GDP: EU11 average
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all unemployment spells lasting less than two or three years do not reduce future pensions
if figurative contributions are being paid by the Social Security Administration. Even
when there is a permanent increase in female labour market participation, the induced
effect on pensions may be quite limited: non working women live longer than men, are
typically married to working men, and would anyway have had a pension entitlement,
even after the death of their husband. Getting those women to work and contribute is
helpful. The peak burden is now lower than in the baseline case, and substantially lower
for countries, such as Italy and Spain, where the current level of female LFPRs is low or
male LFPRs have fallen very sharply during the last 15 years.
Simulation 2 replaces constant Generosity with constant generosity, indexing
pensions after retirement to prices but not to productivity and earnings growth. The
typical profile of the demographic burden sees an initial small decline until about the
year 2005, a subsequent increase until about the year 2035, and then a flattening or a
mild decline. When the changes envisaged by the two previous scenarios are enacted
simultaneously, the demographic burden in simulation 3 is reduced by at least half in all
countries. Most countries actually generate a surplus (relative to current expenditure
levels) for the next 10 15 years.
Simulation 4, which gradually cuts generosity, reduces the demographic burden by
30 40%, again generating large surpluses for the next decade or so. Moreover,
simulations 1 and 4 together imply that most countries would be able to maintain their
pension burden at or below its current (1995) level for the next 55 years.3
These findings provide support for our first two policy prescriptions: before
dismantling existing PAYG systems, there are important and reasonable policy options
available to limit the fiscal burden caused by the ageing bomb. Of course, our
simulations could be further refined. For example, they are partial equilibrium, treating
productivity and wage growth as given, independently of postulated rises in female
LFPRs and cuts in unemployment. Should higher effective labour supply induce lower
real wages, pensions and the fiscal burden would fall, at least until all such effects had
fully worked through the system, which would take several decades.
4. RECONSIDERING THE TRANSITION TO A FULLY FUNDED SYSTEM
EU governments should concentrate upon reducing unemployment and the growth rate
of old pensions before starting to dismantle existing PAYG systems. Still, our discussion
falls short of proving that a transition to a fully funded system would not be superior to
even a reformed PAYG system. We now show why a PAYG system should continue to
exist.
3 Taking current pension burdens as a reference point, the surpluses available in the next 15 years, if properly capitalized,
could help finance subsequent deficits. Such a policy has been adopted in the USA. Current surpluses of the Social Security
Administration are being kept, at least from an accounting point of view, in a Trust Fund to be used later to mitigate the impact
of baby boomers retirement.
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First, in a feasible transition to a fully funded system, all gains are accrued in the far
future and all costs are paid up front. This makes the transition politically untenable
unless intergenerational debt is issued to redress this balance. Second, an optimal
portfolio should contain assets with payoffs determined by the return on both physical
and human capital. Empirical evidence from the EU countries strongly supports this
view, which is coherent with a stochastic version of the simple growth model that we
outline in the following section.
In discussing the transition, we dispute the claim that a small tax now plus the magic
of financial markets is an easy and safe way to avoid the big tax later, the backbone of
the proposal in Feldstein (1999) to reform the US social security system by introducing
an additional 2.3% wage tax, whose proceeds would be invested in stocks and bonds.
Assuming that the portfolio yields an average annual return of 5.5%, the capitalized
value of the tax flow would be enough to cover the additional pension payments that the
US Social Security Administration is expected to face after 2030. Payroll social security
contributions could then remain at the current level (12.4%) instead of rising to 17.8%
or higher, as is commonly forecast.
Would this reform help? Taxation would rise to 14.7%, instead of staying at 12.4%.
What discount rate would equate the pain of an extra 2.3% in tax now and an extra
5.6% tax in 2030? The answer is 5.5%. If this return can safely be earned in the financial
markets, why not announce that the Payroll Social Security tax will remain at 12.4% for
ever and that pension payments will have to balance the budget? Workers could then
retain the 2.3% of their wages that otherwise would have gone in contributions, and be
free to save and invest that money as their risk=return preferences suggest. This cannot
be less efficient than an additional tax distortion plus a Federal official in charge of
portfolio allocation. Miles and Timmermann (1999) also highlight the large increase in
risk entailed in portfolio investment.
One should also consider the redistributive implications of any transition, which
depend on whether fully funded systems replace the current PAYG systems or merely
grow spontaneously in parallel to PAYG systems. We call the first approach
replacement and the second parallel. To be effective, both approaches involve a
sharp reduction in the pensions of those currently retired or going to retire in the next
three decades, a serious issue of intergenerational redistribution, which needs to be
addressed if even a partial transition to a fully funded system is to be viable.
Under the parallel approach, where will additional resources come from to be invested
in funded pension plans? How will the saving rate be increased? Fiscal incentives is a
common refrain but not a realistic solution, not only because the Stability Pact restricts
fiscal spending, but also because private saving is notoriously insensitive to tax incentives.
Alternatively, the replacement approach requires legal coercion to divert, towards
saving and investment, resources currently taxed to finance pension payments. Will other
resources be channelled to pensions or will per capita pensions gradually be reduced?
It is misleading to try to draw lessons from Chile or other Latin American countries,
whose experience was shaped by elements completely missing in the EU. First, their
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unfunded pensions had been at relatively low levels. Second, it was politically feasible for
them to implement a drastic reduction in the absolute income of pensioners. Third, their
demographic structure was the opposite of the EU: many young and few old people.
Any transition to fuller funding is fundamentally an issue of intergenerational
redistribution (see, e.g., Breyer, 1989). The point is simple and intuitive. If the currently
old are expected to receive p under the PAYG plan, switching to capitalization, without
making the current generation worse off, implies financing inherited commitments by
issuing an amount p of public debt. From now on, working generations invest for their
own retirement, but escape social security taxes previously used to fund the PAYG
scheme. But somebody must bear the burden of the accumulated public debt. If this is
charged to the new working generation, they are worse off. Since the argument
presupposes that asset returns exceed productivity growth, the cost of repaying the debt
with interest exceeds the social security contributions, even allowing for wage and
productivity growth, that they would have had to pay under the old PAYG system.
There is no free lunch.
Miles and Timmermann (1999) undertake quantitative simulations to estimate which
generations gain and which lose. The answer is clear: under a wide range of realistic
parameter values, a transition from unfunded to funded pensions would entail drastic
cuts in living standards of generations currently alive, not only among existing
pensioners, but even among the young who have yet to join the labour force. The
generations that would gain have yet to be born. The redistributive implications make a
full transition politically infeasible.
A (partial) transition to a fully funded system is realistic only if most of the transitional
costs are financed by issuing new public debt, the cost of servicing and redeeming such
debt then being shared equally by all the generations benefiting from the reform.
Holzmann (1997) makes initial estimates of the amounts involved, but more empirical
and theoretical work is needed before we can feel comfortable with this assessment. Such
research is a priority because, in our view, this approach is probably the only way to
implement any version of the consensus view.
5. DESIGNING AN OPTIMAL PENSION SYSTEM
The supposed efficiency of a fully funded system is based upon the following two facts.
First, PAYG pensions entail distortionary taxes to fund contributions, whereas funded
pensions rely on voluntary private saving that involves no distortions. Second, unfunded
systems are an income transfer from the young to the old. This is efficient only if the
growth rate of the total wage bill is higher than the rate of return on capital (Diamond,
1977). When this is untrue, as in the EU during the last 20 years, PAYG pensions yield
an inefficiently low return on money invested.
The first claim is correct and may be quantitatively important. It is less clear whether
the response should be a switch to fully funded pensions or piecemeal reform of the
PAYG system: for example, reducing generosity, to alleviate the distortionary burden of
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taxes that finance contributions. However, it would be wrong to view pension design
merely through the lens of efficiency. In practice, pension funds reflect a host of fiscal and
legal incentives unjustifiable on grounds of economic efficiency. This reveals that
distributional and other implications of pension systems are of enormous importance,
and we have explained why the distributional impact of a complete transition to full
funding makes it a non starter.
The second claim is correct only in a world in which physical capital is the only
reproducible production input and the only channel through which individuals can
transfer income from the present to the future. It is not correct when there is a second
productive asset, human capital, that can be accumulated over time, contributing to
future production, but whose rights of ownership cannot be traded in financial markets
or transferred from one individual to another. In such circumstances, efficient resource
allocation over time requires accumulation of both productive assets in the appropriate
proportion: namely, to the point at which, controlling for differential risks, the different
investments yield the same return. Fully funded pension plans are not strictly superior to
unfunded ones, either in theory or in fact. Neither strictly dominates the other. A well
designed public pension system should adopt both.
5.1. Why keep an unfunded pension system?
Many problems of information and commitment inhibit the development of markets for
credit to finance investment in individual human capital. Without well functioning credit
markets, market forces do not bring about efficient resource allocation, either static or
dynamic.
Suppose people live for three periods. The young attend school, receive an education
and prepare for work. The middle aged sell their accumulated human capital on the
market, earn a wage, consume and save for retirement. The old consume out of past
savings. Each period, a new generation is born and an old one dies. Both human and
physical capital are inputs to production. Better engineers operate machines more
efficiently; more machines enhance the productivity of engineers. Ideally, both kinds of
capital are accumulated. Assume the young have no resources to invest in their own
education, and that parents choose privately to provide their children with a level of
human capital that is too small for social efficiency: even when parents care about the
consumption or the human capital level of their descendants, they do not fully internalize
the benefits that this higher human capital conveys on the productivity of the
descendants of other parents.
Suppose, first, that there is a complete set of financial markets. In particular, anyone can
borrow at the going interest rate provided only that they are solvent and will credibly
repay. To finance their education, the young borrow from the middle aged, who lend to
the young, up to the point at which the return from this investment in future human
capital equals the return on investment in physical capital. This stylized economy
accumulates both types of capital in the efficient amounts.
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Incomplete markets, however, impair efficiency. In practice, many financial
instruments exist to finance the accumulation of physical capital. It is mainly in the
financing of human capital that market failures arise. Without government intervention,
human capital would be well below the efficient level. How might this be remedied?
Table 7 summarizes the tax=transfer process. Suppose members of subsequent
generations implement a repeated sequence of intergenerational transfers. Each period,
two taxes are levied on the middle aged to provide resources for two transfers. Revenue
from the first tax is used to finance a pension for the elderly. Revenue from the second
tax is used to finance investment in the education of the young.
5.2. The optimal system of intergenerational transfers
Complete markets would induce private behaviour that led to efficient amounts of
educational investment and physical capital accumulation. With incomplete markets for
the financing of human capital, in principle, one could choose the levels of taxation in
the above scheme to ensure the same, efficient, level of human capital accumulation
through education, the same investment in physical capital, and consequently the
efficient level of pension in retirement. The middle aged can still be left to make private
saving decisions and accumulate assets to finance their retirement.
In these circumstances, a PAYG scheme is efficient but a fully funded one is not. No
matter how much the middle aged save to accumulate physical assets to provide for their
retirement, this does nothing to help the young overcome market failures in borrowing to
finance their education. Allowing explicit parental altruism might lead to partial funding,
but, as we explained above, parents will never fully internalize the beneficial spillovers on
children of other parents.
Nor could efficiency be accomplished by free public schooling unconnected to PAYG
pensions. The induced wealth effects on the middle aged lead them to consume more
than is dynamically efficient. Moreover, each middle aged generation would be tempted
to dismantle public education when its turn to finance it arrived. Only the explicit
intergenerational linkage (no pension for you if you default on financing the education of
the young) underpins the correct allocation over time.4
Table 7. Generational income and spending, and lifetime budget
Generation Net incomings Outgoings
Young Subsidy from first type of tax Education
Middle aged Labour income Two types of tax Consumption Saving
Old PensionReturn on own savings Consumption
4 For further discussion and technical details, see Boldrin and Montes (1998).
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Our scheme is also intergenerationally fair, providing each generation with a market
driven return from its investment in human capital. In the literature on PAYG social
security systems the issue of actuarial fairness between contributions paid and pensions
received is hotly debated. Our model suggests that one should test actuarial fairness by
comparing contributions paid with the amount of public education received and by
comparing taxes devoted to public education with pension payments.
Finally, we need to address the feasibility of such a scheme in the current EU context,
and also recognize that the taxes we propose would themselves introduce further
distortions. Political feasibility hinges on the extent to which the proposed system would
affect the intergenerational transfers already taking place through public education and
pensions. A proper answer requires extensive and detailed microeconomic data analysis
country by country. Such study has been performed for Spain,5 where our scheme would
imply only relatively minor adjustments relative to the current system. Taking current
Spanish investment in public education as given, our estimate of the efficient system
would entail lowering the average pension by 2 9%.
5.3. Risky returns revisited
Our model treats returns on physical and human capital as safe; in practice, they are
risky. Table 8 reports historical averages and Table 9 presents the estimated
variance covariance matrix. We do not report explicit computations of private returns
on human capital, for which we have been unable to find comparable estimates. To the
extent that labour earnings are gross returns from human capital, their mean growth rate
and standard deviations are a reasonable proxy for the corresponding return on human
capital investment. The reported figures confirm that the return on physical capital is
uncertain and risky, and that the rate of growth of real wages is less risky. Expected
returns are higher for physical than human capital, but both their relative volatility and
their covariance structure suggest that neither one dominates the other in a mean
variance sense. More significantly, the two returns are negatively correlated.
Diversification of risk provides an additional reason to invest in both human and
physical capital, a second reason to retain some form of PAYG pension system.
Financial engineering alone would not suffice. Issuing bonds or derivative securities
whose return is positively linked to the growth of labour earnings can help diversify
individual portfolios, but it cannot diversify aggregate portfolios. The market portfolio
can be diversified only if there are securities which finance investment in human capital
and which, therefore, are direct claims to a portion of future labour earnings. A PAYG
pension, in which returns are linked to previous investments in human capital, is just
such a security.
5 See Boldrin and Montes (1998), and, for the complete details, Montes (1998).
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Table 8. Average real returns on different assets, 1961 96 (% per annum)
USA Germany UK France Italy Japan
GDP growth 1961 70 3.8 4.3 2.8 5.4 5.6 9.9
1971 80 2.8 2.7 1.9 3.3 3.5 4.4
1981 90 2.6 2.2 2.6 2.3 2.2 3.9
1991 96 2.1 3.2 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.8
Earnings 1961 70 4.0 4.5 3.3 5.2 5.2 5.2
1971 80 2.6 3.0 1.9 3.9 3.6 3.6
1981 90 2.4 1.3 2.7 1.2 2.2 2.2
1991 96 2.1 3.2 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.3
Long bonds 1961 70 1.7 3.0 2.8 2.1 2.2
1971 80 0.1 2.7 1.6 0.4 3.4 0.5
1981 90 5.4 4.7 4.6 5.1 4.4 4.6
1991 96 4.3 4.0 4.8 5.6 6.5 3.7
Equities 1961 70 4.8 4.1 0.3 3.4 1.9
1971 80 0.2 4.3 4.5 4.4 17.9 4.9
1981 90 11.5 11.3 9.8 11.1 15.9 15.8
1991 96 16.5 0.3 5.4 0.1 4.5 4.4
Notes: Earnings is real growth of employee compensation, adjusted for self-employment; return on long bonds is
long-term interest rate deflated by growth of GDP deflator; real equity returns are growth rates of stock market
indexes deflated by GDP (but, because of data unavailability, they do not include dividends).
Table 9. Standard deviations and correlations of annual returns, 1961 96
GDP growth Earnings Bonds Equities
USA GDP growth 2.02
Earnings 0.85 1.74
Bonds 0.01 0.02 2.48
Equities 0.18 0.35 0.39 16.70
Germany GDP growth 2.66
Earnings 0.89 2.89
Bonds 0.10 0.31 1.45
Equities 0.07 0.37 0.28 16.32
UK GDP growth 1.99
Earnings 0.61 2.11
Bonds 0.35 0.09 3.51
Equities 0.35 0.09 0.27 16.25
France GDP growth 1.96
Earnings 0.80 2.19
Bonds 0.33 0.63 2.47
Equities 0.11 0.39 0.21 18.73
Italy GDP growth 2.35
Earnings 0.70 2.48
Bonds 0.27 0.39 4.41
Equities 0.14 0.16 0.23 38.82
Japan GDP growth 3.53
Earnings 0.69 2.48
Bonds 0.12 0.34 4.01
Equities 0.20 0.08 0.29 19.08
Notes: Standard deviations in bold. Data for Italian equities, and for bonds and equities in Japan, are for
1971 96 not 1961 96.
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6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Public unfunded pension plans, currently in place in most European countries, are
doomed to become fiscally, and therefore politically, untenable in about 15 to 25 years
time. This fate is determined by a number of concurrent factors: demographic trends, the
rapidly increasing proportion of elderly people in the population; the rapid decrease in
labour force participation of men, the slow increase in the participation of women, and
persistently high unemployment rates; the policy of increasing the real value of
outstanding pensions at the rate of labour productivity growth; and the policy of
increasing incentives for early retirement by people aged 55 and over.
Only the first is truly exogenous difficult to modify by policy even in the medium run.
All other trends reflect political choices. These may be based on legitimate social concerns,
but are generally unrelated to the purposes and functioning of PAYG pensions.
Using calibrated numerical simulations, we have shown that, by reversing those ill
fated political choices, unfunded public pension schemes could be rescued. Assuming
labour productivity grows annually by 2% for the next 55 years, we can identify four
conditions jointly sufficient to maintain the pension=GDP ratio below or equal to its
current level until 2050. First, reduce the ratio between new pensions and labour
productivity by half a percentage point a year, while maintaining the real value of old
pensions. Second, during 2000 50 find a way to restore male labour force participation
rates to the levels of the early 1980s. Third, raise female participation rates to 80% of
male rates by 2050. Fourth, cut unemployment rates for men to half their current level,
and equate female and male unemployment rates by 2050.
Proponents of fiscally supported transitions to fully funded pensions have failed to
consider or properly address several controversial issues. First, fiscal incentives to
promote private pensions require higher taxation elsewhere. It is unclear where the
additional saving comes from. Transition to a fully funded system requires either a
drastic reduction in pension payments to the currently retired or issuance of earmarked
debt and a corresponding relaxation of the debt ceilings established by the Stability and
Growth Pact.
Even if the growth rate of labour productivity remains well below the rate of return on
capital, a transition from PAYG to full funding cannot be beneficial to everybody. It
must, inevitably, imply some loss for the generations currently alive. Careful analysis
shows that the benefits will accrue only to generations not yet born. Such a reform is not
politically feasible.
Moreover, a PAYG system, even if smaller than at present, is necessary for achieving
intergenerational efficiency and fairness and to sustain long run growth, at least while we
do not find means better than public expenditure for financing the accumulation of
human capital.
A PAYG system is also necessary for beneficial portfolio diversification. The optimal
relative size of the two systems (PAYG and funded), and the generosity of the PAYG
system, can be calculated using historical evidence and standard economic theory.
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The historical experience of unfunded pension schemes in Europe reminds us of the
wisdom of distinguishing market completing from redistributive policies. PAYG
pension plans are public institutions aimed at alleviating inefficiencies generated by the
lack of particular financial markets. Their use has camouflaged redistribution, motivated
by rent seeking and political purposes, has turned into an abuse, and has brought the
systems close to financial bankruptcy.
In the justifiable and commendable process of getting rid of such distributional
distortions, one does not want to throw the baby out with the bath water. PAYG public
pensions serve a useful purpose, which should be salvaged and enhanced by a deeper
reform of the European welfare state.
Discussion
Friedrich Breyer
Universit×at Konstanz
This is a very timely and important paper because the sustainability of public pension
systems is an urgent policy issue in most European countries. I also agree with most of
the authors analysis and conclusions. However, there are two points where I would
place the emphasis slightly differently:
* the relative importance of demographic and labour market factors in explaining the
problems in future pension financing; and
* the relative advantages of different speeds of transition from the predominantly
PAYG system to a mixed system of pension financing.
Demographic and labour market determinants of the pension financing crisis
Two different aspects of demographic change are important in explaining the difficulties
in pension financing across Europe: a massive increase in residual life expectancy at age
60 (or 65), and a rapid decline in net reproduction rates. The first raises the tax rate
necessary to finance a given earnings replacement rate, but it does so no matter whether
the financing method is funding or PAYG. The policy recommendation for dealing with
this phenomenon is simple: raise the retirement age so as to leave the relative length of
the retirement period in adult life constant, or cut pension benefits in reverse proportion.
Either method assures that the relative positions of the respective generations (their
discounted net payments into or receipts from the pension system) remain unchanged
when compared to the situation before the demographic change.
In contrast, a decline in fertility holding constant the long run paths of the rates of
interest and productivity growth unilaterally decreases the rate of return of unfunded
pension systems and raises questions of intergenerational redistribution. A simple look at
the development of the net reproduction rates in Europe between 1970 and 1995
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(Eurostat, 1996) shows a dramatic change, which is not so transparent in the fertility rate
differences stated by the authors in Table 2. While in 1970, the average net reproduction
rate in the EU15 was 1.13 (with a maximum value of 1.81 in Ireland and a minimum of
0.87 in Finland, the average for 1994 was 0.69 (with 0.90 in Finland and Sweden and
0.58 in Italy and Spain). These figures alone show that, abstracting from massive
migration, the relation between tax rates and benefit rates in any PAYG system will
deteriorate on average by more than one half.
Compared to these secular changes, variations in labour force participation can have
at most short run effects. First of all, in a PAYG system a given pension burden must be
fully borne by the subsequent generation no matter whether this generation chooses to
work little (and pay a high contribution rate) or much (and pay a smaller tax rate per
unit of income). Therefore it is an illusion to think that the burden itself was alleviated
through a decline in the tax rate. Moreover, in most pension systems, the benefits of an
individual are related to his or her total lifetime earnings. As a consequence, increasing
present labour force participation will raise the benefit claims of the current workers,
which have to be met by the next generation, thus aggravating the financing problems in
the future (Breyer et al., 1997).
Hence I would place the main emphasis on the demographic development and would
be hesitant to expect any alleviation from increasing labour force participation rates.
Partial transition to funded pensions
Here, the authors are somewhat vague in their policy conclusions. On the one hand,
they are in favour of a mixed pension system composed of funded and unfunded parts.
On the other hand, they claim that all generations currently alive would suffer from a
transition to such a system.
Taking the results in Breyer (1989) and Fenge (1995) seriously, it is certainly true that
a transition from pure PAYG even to a mixed system (let alone pure capital funding)
cannot make every generation better off. Thus, the matter boils down to a question of
intergenerational redistribution, and here the economist should be extremely careful
with policy recommendations.
Leaving the normative issue aside, the political feasibility of such a transition is
certainly an interesting object of positive economics, and here the authors are much
more explicit. In their view, because the political viability of a drastic transition is quite
low, policies to spread costs and benefits in a homogeneous way across generations
should be designed.
On this point, I am not so sure that they are right. After all, again taking the
theoretical literature seriously, what is to be spread across generations are just costs and
no benefits. Now it is certainly true for majority decisions that it is easier to make some
(minority) group suffer a lot than to make everybody suffer a little. If this general message
is applied to generations, a proposal that would harm the generation of present
pensioners by cutting PAYG financed pensions immediately and drastically may have
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only a small chance of surviving a majority vote, and whether it does so should depend
on the degree of altruism within families. However, a proposal to cut pensions by small
bits over a long transition period (possibly using explicit public debt as a camouflage),
thereby harming all living generations and perhaps one or two subsequent unborn ones
on top, will by all received theories of public choice not draw support from any
present voter and is therefore politically even less viable.
Raquel FernÑandez
New York University
This paper is composed of two distinct parts. The first describes trends in public pension
provision in the EU, and attempts to simulate the effects of changes in labour market
conditions on the overall fiscal burden. The second presents a theoretical justification for
retaining at least some publicly funded pay as you go pension scheme.
The authors begin by describing the current state of public pension provision in the
EU, and the expected impact of demographic changes over the next 50 years. Holding
other factors constant unemployment and labour force participation demographic
trends will make the fiscal burden of these schemes rise sharply, more than doubling in
most cases to levels of 20 to 30% of GDP. It is generally agreed that the tax increases
implied by such a burden are likely to be politically and economically unsustainable. The
contribution of the paper is to quantify the contribution that non demographic factors
the level of unemployment, female labour force participation, the generosity of the
pension system might make towards offsetting these increases.
The single most interesting point is the potentially large effect of changes in labour
market conditions. Increasing female labour force participation, and reducing male
unemployment by half, would mitigate the increase in the fiscal burden by a third to a
half. Similar reductions could be achieved by freezing the level of pensions, once
awarded, in real terms.6 Combining these two changes would cut the increase resulting
from the demographic burden by more than half, and further apparently minor
reductions in the generosity of pensions could almost eliminate it.
The problem, however, with all these simulations (even leaving aside their partial
equilibrium nature) is that they abstract away from the detailed provisions of the pension
schemes, assuming instead, in the baseline case, that the average pension grows in line
with average labour productivity. This in turn creates two problems. First, in the case of
the proposed changes to the generosity of pension schemes, it makes it rather difficult to
assess the political viability of the proposed policy changes. What changes would actually
be needed to the rules of the Spanish pension system, for example, to freeze on average
the levels of pensions once awarded? Second, in the case of the changes in labour market
behaviour, it abstracts away from the fact that such changes would, given the nature of
6 Somewhat confusingly, the authors distinguish between a policy of constant generosity, where newly awarded pensions are
related to the level of labour productivity at the time they are awarded, but subsequently fixed in real terms, and a policy of
constant Generosity, where even subsequent to retirement their value is increased in line with labour productivity.
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contribution related pension schemes, affect the level of pensions. If female labour force
participation increased (and male unemployment decreased), that would indeed increase
social security contributions and hence make schemes more solvent; this is the effect
quantified in the paper. However, since these extra workers would be accumulating
pension entitlements themselves (rather than being dependent on their husbands
pensions, or some basic minimum), pension expenditures would be increased. This effect
is not quantified and would to some extent offset the first.
Nevertheless, these results are likely to be a useful guide for policy makers. They are a
helpful reminder that demography is not destiny, and that the more apocalyptic
predictions about Europes unfunded pension burden are overdone. Numerous
available policy instruments could make a substantial contribution to saving Europes
publicly funded pension schemes in something resembling their present form. The
authors are quite correct in their descriptions of the practical problems involved in any
major switch to a funded scheme: data they present on stock returns, showing real
returns averaging between 0.8% (Germany) and 5.5% (Japan), indicate why the
statement in the introduction that the growth rate of the market value of private
investments has been ... 10% a year in real terms in the EU ... and is not expected to
drop in the future is wholly unrealistic.7 Since much of the momentum behind the
proposals for funded pension schemes is based on the argument that stock market returns
will inevitably outpace earnings growth, this is an important point.
Switching tack completely, the second part of the paper moves from a description of
the current pay as you go systems in Europe to a theoretical argument in favour of pay
as you go pension provision. Briefly, the argument is that pay as you go systems can
provide a means of financing investment in human capital, and in particular that part of
human capital investment basically primary and secondary education for which
functioning credit markets are largely absent. The uncertainty of future returns
especially to investments financed by financial instruments strengthens the case for
publicly financed investment in human capital. In itself, this argument is clearly sound.
In the context of this paper, the unanswered question is, of course, how well designed
public pension schemes actually are to achieve this objective. In another paper, one of
the authors finds that the Spanish system requires on average only minor adjustments.
However, this on average is a major caveat, and points up a significant problem with
both this part of the paper and the policy recommendations. The authors seem to regard
it as inappropriate for publicly funded pension schemes to contain any redistributional
element, arguing that PAYG pension plans are public institutions aimed at alleviating
inefficiencies generated by the lack of certain financial markets. Their use has
camouflaged redistribution motivated by rent seeking and political purposes [and] has
turned into an abuse .... As a positive statement, this is simply wrong. PAYG pension
plans were introduced first to alleviate the unacceptable level of poverty among the
7 It is not clear whether the authors endorse this statement or regard it as part of the conventional wisdom.
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elderly that resulted from the creation of an urban industrial proletariat and the
associated breakdown of the extended family. They were then expanded as part of the
postwar European (and American) social bargain.8 Both of these purposes were and
remain explicitly redistributional. Whether this is the appropriate way for the
government to redistribute is another question. It may, in any case, be one of the few
politically acceptable ways to do so.
General discussion
Peter Birch S÷rensen observed that, in order to assess the proposal to freeze pension
generosity, it would be helpful to spell out the effect of this reform on the path of future
replacement ratios once the pensions profile after retirement was no longer indexed to
productivity. Katharine Rockett extended this implicit concern about political feasibility.
What would happen if an individual decided not to contribute? How would government
respond if poverty in pensions was the result not of bad luck, but of deliberate neglect of
the individual need to save? Deeper analysis of political economy aspects would greatly
enhance the appeal of particular hypothetical policy simulations.
Stephen Nickell noted that the measures to reduce labour supply and massage
unemployment data in ways favourable to politicians often had the consequence of
increasing the social security burden; measures to promote early retirement or sickness
benefits obviously fell into such a category. Pension reform should therefore attempt to
take a comprehensive view of social security policy design. Jakob de Haan was sceptical
about one of the scenarios of the paper, in which it was assumed that it was possible both
to reduce unemployment and to have rapid productivity growth. Dutch experience
showed that higher participation rates were often accompanied by lower rates of
productivity growth and of earnings. Marco Pagano wondered to what extent the paper
has taken into account the potential problem of increasingly high inter European
immigration flows.
Alan Timmermann argued that the policy recommendation to have a mixed pension
system should be strengthened by providing more evidence to support it. To the extent
that the recommendation was based on the fact that the PAYG system incorporated
components not captured by funded schemes in the presence of incomplete markets, one
could examine the factors underlying the whole set of traded assets, say in the USA, and
analyse incompleteness directly.
David Begg remarked that most economics suggests that we should target
interventions at the source of the problem. In this case, the source of the problem is
the demographic change. In this respect, not only should birth rates be treated as
8 It should not be forgotten that, while the European welfare state is overall substantially more generous than the US one, the
contrast is not nearly so great in the specific area of public provision for old age. In particular, the US social security system has
largely eliminated poverty among the elderly, while doing relatively little for poor children.
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endogenous, as recent evidence from eastern Europe demonstrates, but also more
emphasis should be given to the retirement age, which because of the policy makers
inertia has not been raised. Changing the ratio of work years to (expected) years in
retirement might be politically easier than changing the generosity of the annual
replacement rate.
The authors offered several responses to the Panel discussion. Firstly, under the
current pension system, internal rates of return are very high, making the current system
unsustainable. Some change to PAYG was needed. The PAYG system was designed in a
period in which typically, in the representative household, only the man was working,
whereas today the household participation rate has increased, and the composition of
households themselves has changed. This in itself provided a rationale for amending the
parameters of the existing system, and such changes should be explored before
concluding that a completely new system is required. Finally, as far as political viability is
concerned, calculations for Spain indicated that, if some reform were undertaken,
sustainability could be restored without abandoning the PAYG system as the basis of
pensions.
APPENDIX
Table A1. Institutional features of European pensions
Public PAYG scheme Pensions from
employers
Private pensions
Flat rate Earnings related schemes Coverage % of GDP % of GDP
(%)
Benefit related Special
contributions schemes
Austria yes MT yes yes
Belgium yes MT yes yes 31 3 11
Denmark yes MT yes no 80 20 84
Finland yes MT no yes 35
France yes MT yes yes <10 3 7
Germany no yes yes 46 6 14
Greece no yes yes
Ireland yes MT no no 40 40
Italy yes MT yes yes 5 1 7
Netherlands yes no no 85 89 127
Portugal yes MT yes yes 15 9
Spain yes MT yes yes 15 2 4
Sweden yes yes no 66
UK yes no no 75 79 77
Source: US Dept of Health and Human Resources (1998).
Note: MT is means tested, coverage is % of private employment in early 1990s, shares of GDP refer to 1993
data, private pensions include funded pensions provided by employers.
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Table A2. Public earnings-related pensions in sample of countries, mid-1990s
Contribution Eligibility Pension Indexed to Widows
(%) benefit
Age Contribution Early Benefits Maximum
Worker Firm (M, W) years retirement
(M, W)
Aust 10.25 12.55 65, 60 15 of last 30 60, 55 1.83% earnings in best 15 years of first 30
years
80% of average covered
earnings;
Wages 40 60%
1.675% for each year 31 45 60% if early retirement
Belg 7.5 8.86 65, 61 45 (M), 41 (W) Based on salary and length of work 60 75% average lifetime
earnings
CPI 80%
Denm 33.3 66.7 67 50 66 Based on entry date and contributions 13 500 kroner p.a. Wages Lump sum
of max of 2332 (if work 40 years)
kroner
Fin 4.5 16.6 65 40 60 1.5% per year worked (2.5% after age 59) 60 70% CPI up to 50%
Average wage in 2 of last 4 years (eliminating
highest and lowest)
Fra 6.55 8.2 65 37.5 60 50% of highest 10 years 50% CPI 52%
GSC & 1.6%
total payroll
Ger 10.15 10.15 65, 60 at least 5 60 (earnings=avge earnings) (years) 70% (after 45 years) Wages 60 100%,
 46 DM=month 3 months max
Gre <8.87 <14.73 65, 60 4500 days 58, 50 30 70% earnings in last 5 years Pensions of 70%
civil servants
Ire <7.75 <12.2% 66 156 weeks 71 116.5 punts=week 64.5
punts=wk
Ita 6 24.5 63, 58 50 1.6 2% of average lifetime earnings CPI 60%
Net 16.35 65 1988 2860 guilders (couple); 1430 (single) Minimum wage 1755 2040
guilders
Por 7.7 16.7 65 180 months 60 2% of earnings per year; average annual 80% CPI 60%
earnings during highest 10 of last 15 years
Spa 4.7 23.6 65 15 60 3.5% (first 15 years) 2.5% (rest); 100% (after 35 years) CPI 45%
average of last 15 years
Swe 13.0 65 30 60 60% (average of last 15 years) Wages 40%
UK <10 <10 65, 60 £58.85=wk supplement CPI £58.85=wk
US 6.2 6.2 65 62 Based on lifetime earnings $2099=month CPI 100%
Jap 8.67 8.67 60, 59 25 60 0.75% times months worked CPI
Source: US Dept of Health and Human Resources (1998).
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